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I. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of streamlining planning procedures in relation 
to major developmental works has only received serious 
consideration in recent years in New Zealand, mainly in 
response to the way in which the country was affected by 
the energy crisis. The Goll'lmitment of Government to certain 
'Think Sig' energy projects and its desire to avoid the 
delays inherent in the established procedures resulted in the 
passage of the National Development Act 1979. 
Unlike many pieces of New Zealand legislation, this statute 
was drafted without reference to Pre-existing law elsewhere 
in the world and in this r~gard it is considered to be unique. 
However, it is virtually certain now, following the election 
to power of the Labour Government on 14 July 1984, that the 
days of the National Development Act 1979 are numbered. In 
spite of this the importance of the Act cannot be denied in 
that it created for the first time in statutory form a 
streamlined decision-making procedure from which valuable 
experience has been gained and which should provide a basis 
for any future attempts to cut through the quagmire of normal 
planning procedures. 
In this paper it is proposed to analy.s e and comment critically 
on the scheme and content of the National Development Act and 
how it has worked to date followed by some conjecture as to 
reform. 
2 • 
II. BACKGROUND 
The impetus for the former National Government's 'Think Big' 
policy in relation to energy development can be traced back 
to the energy crisis which confronted New Zealand in the 
e a r l y 19 7 0 ' s • N e w · Z e a l and h a s a l w a y s b e e n h e a v i l y d e pe n d e n t 
on imported fuels and it was recognised that this source of 
energy would become less re liable and more ex pensive. An 
important Government objective, therefore, became to achieve 
greater self-sufficiency in the production of energy in 
particular and other resources in general. 
New Zealand's hydro-electrical potential was obvious and 
the Maui gasfield had been discovered in 1969. It was the 
Government's urgent desire to ensure that certain projects 
aimed at utilising Maui gas would be able to proceed without 
undue delay that directly led to the decision to provide for 
a fast-track planning procedure for major works. 
Following numerous attempts at drafting it, the National 
Development Bill was introduced into Parliament on Friday, 
October 5, 1979, by the then Minister of i'-lational Development 
The Hon. W.F. Birch. Addressing Parliament on the likelihood 
of New Zealand seeing a number of major energy developments, 
l he stated: 
1. N.Z. Parliamentary Debates Vol.426, 1979, 3352 
3. 
Long delays in obtaining consents and approvals for 
such projects are a real possibility under present 
procedures, and such delays could not only be extremely 
costly, but could also undermine the viability of the 
project. Although the Government is conscious of the 
serious risk of unaffordable delays, it does not want 
to have large-scale proposals rushed through without 
proper public scrutiny. The new system provided in 
the Bill simply shortens the time taken, and eliminates 
the potential delay inherent in a large number of 
separate procedures by consolidating the examination of 
the proposal and the issuing of appropriate consents 
into one procedure. 
The major concern of the Government appears to have been the 
potential under the existing procedures for delays resulting from 
hearings at council and tribunal level followed by proceedings 
in the High Court, the Court of Appeal and possibly even the 
Privy Council. In particular, prominent Government 
parliamentarians repeatedly referred to the delays associated 
with the approvals for the Clyde dam and the Kariori pulpmill. 
Following its introduction, the National Development Bill was 
hotly, and at tir,ie, angrily, debated in Parliament. At times 
constructive debate on the issues was lost sight of with 
Government members accusing the Labour Opposition of being 
against development while the latter argued that the Bill, 
amongst other things, allowed the Minister to play God. 
Opposition to the Bill did result in substantial amendment to 
it, perhaps most importantly in allowing for judicial review. 
4 • 
The National Development Act was passed into law on 14 
December 1979. It is noteworthy that the Act is not confined 
to enerqy-related projects - these are not specific-ally 
referred to in the long title which reads: 
"An Act to provide for the prompt consideration of 
proposed works of national importance by the direct 
referral of the proposals to the Planning Tribunal 
for an inquiry and report and by providing for such 
works to receive the necessary consents." 
To date there has been one amendment to the Act (the 
National Development Amendment Act 1981), three Orders in 
Council pursuant to section 3(3) of the Act have been made 
(which relate to the Petralgas Chemicals NZ Ltd methanol 
plant at 'Naitara, the NZ Synthetic Fuels Corporation Ltd 
synthetic petroleum plant at Motonui and the South Pacific 
Aluminium Ltd aluminium smelter and associated facilities 
at Aramoana) and two Orders in Council pursuant to section 11 
have been made, namely the National Development (Petralgas 
Chemicals NZ Ltd) Order 1981 and the National Development 
(NZ Synthetic Fuels Corporation Ltd) Order 1982. The 
Synthetic Fuels Plant (Effluent Disposal) Empowering Act 
1983 came into force on 22 November 1983. 
5 . 
II I. THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ACT 1979 
A. Scheme of the Act 
It is considered desirable to outline the way in which the 
Act works before proceeding to its provisions in more depth. 
Any person may apply for the provisions of the Act to be 
applied to a contemplated work. If the Governor-General in 
Council considers that the work meets certain criteria, the 
provisions of the Act may be applied to the work or any part 
of it . Th e Mi n is t er refer s t h e a p pl i cat i on t o t h e P 1 an n i n g 
Tribunal for an inquiry, report and recommendation and gives 
public notice that he has done so. The Minister sends copies 
of the application -to various authorities and any person is 
entitled at that stage to obtain a copy of the application from 
the Tribunal. 
As soon as practicable after applying, the applicant forwards 
an environmental impact report to the Commissioner for the 
Environment who makes it available to the public and calls for 
submissions. After considering the latter, he gives his 
opinion on the environmental implications of the work in the 
form of an audit which is made available to the public. Copies 
of the application a:re also sent to every statutory authority 
which would normally grant any consent set out in the application. 
These authorities carry out the appropriate investigations and 
make recommendations to the Tribunal which conducts a public 
inquiry. 
6 • 
Once the inquiry is completed, the Tribunal prepares and 
submits to the Minister, and makes publicly available, a 
reasoned report and recommendation. After taking into account 
the Tribunal's report and recommendation and again considering 
the section 3(3) criteria, the Governor-General in Council 
may declare the work to be one of national importance and 
gr a n t s u c h of t h e c o n s e n t s set out i n the a p pl i c a t i on , and on 
such terms as he thinks fit. This Order in Council must be 
laid before Parliament within fourteen days. If it differs 
from the Tribunal's recommendations, the Minister must lay 
be f ore P a r l i amen t a written state men t of the reasons for t he 
difference. However, the consents take effect from the date 
when the Order in Council comes into force. 
B. The Application 
l . W h o ma y a p pl y u n d e r t h e Ac t ? 
Pursuant to section 3(1) any person may apply to the Minister 
of National Development for the Act to be applied to any 
Government or private work. Although the word 'person' is 
not expressly defined in the Act, it clearly refers to both 
n at u r a l a n d a r t i f i c i al per s ons • H owe v e r , sect i on 2 ( l ) 
defines "applicant" as firstly, in respect of a Government 
work, the Minister of National Development, and secondly, in 
respect of a private work, the person proposing to construct, 
undertake or operate the work or cause the work to be 
constructed, undertaken or operated. In view of the fact that 
the Act contemplates major works of national importance, it 
was hardly envisaged that a natural person would have the 
wherewithal to establish such a work, but nevertheless such a 
person is not excluded from applying. 
7 • 
Section 3(1) specifically refers to any "Government work" 
or "private work". Does this mean that a proposed joint 
venture between the Government and a non-Government corporation 
is excluded from the application of the Acl? It is submitted 
that such a work must be considered partly a Government work 
and partly a private work. "Government work" is defined in 
section 2(1) as a work constructed or intended to be constructed 
by or on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen or the Government 
of New Zealand or any Minister of the Crown and includes the 
construction, undertaking, and operation of the work. 
On the other hand "private work" is defined as a work 
constructed or intended to be constructed by or on behalf of 
any person or body other than Her Majesty the Queen or the 
Government of New Zealand or any Minister of the Crown and 
includes the construction, undertaking and operation of the 
work. 
A literal interpretation of section 3(1) results in the Act 
only being applicable to one or the other type of work. On 
t h i s g r o u n d , i t i s c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n t o a p pl y t he 
Act to a joint Government/private work might be impugned. 
Alternatively, such a work might be viewed as primarily a 
Government work with a degree of private assistance in which 
case an application by the Minister of Works and Development 
could be acceptable for the purposes of section 3; or the work 
might be seen as essentially a private work involving Government 
assistance which would necessitate the corporation applying. 
8 • 
To date there has been no application made for the Act to 
be applied to a strictly Government work, although Government 
involvement has been clearly apparent in two of the 
applications made to date. Fiftyone percent of the shares 
of Petralgas Chemicals N.Z. Limited are held by the 
Petroleum Corporation of Nav Zealand Limited which in turn 
is wholly owned by the Government, although registered as 
a private limited liability company. The remaining shares 
in Petralgas Chemicals N.Z. Ltd are held by the Government's 
partner, Alberta Gas Chemicals Ltd. Similarly, although N.Z. 
Synthetic Fuels Corporation Ltd is registered as a private 
limited liability company, it is seventyfive percent Government-
owned (in the form of NZ Liquid Fuels Investment Ltd) while 
Mobil Petroleum Company Incorporated holds the remainder of 
the shares,bar one. The only other applicant under the 
National Development Act, South Pacific Aluminium Ltd, does 
not have Government involvement. 
2. What must the application contain? 
Twenty copies of the application to have the Act applied to 
a work must be submitted to the Minister . 2 
Section 3(2) provide s: 
E v er y s u c h a p pl i c at i o n s h a 11 -
( a ) S pe c if y the reasons why the a p pl i c ant c onside r s 
the work meets or wi 11 meet the criteria set out 
in subsection (3) of this section: 
( b ) De s c r i b e t h e la n d on w h i c h i t i s pr o posed t o 
construct the work, and the reasons why the site 
i s pr e f er r e d t o o t h e r pr a c t i c a b l e s i t e s : 
2. National Development Act 1979, s.3(1) 
9 • 
(c) Give such particulars as would be required if 
an application for the consent were made in the 
normal way: 
(d) Be accompanied by such plans as will generally 
describe the proposed work and by a plant of its 
proposed location on the site: 
(e) Specify every consent that he wishes to have granted 
t o h i m u n d er t hi s Ac t , t h e s pe c i f i c s t at u t or y pr o v i s i o n 
under which the consent would normally be granted (being 
a statutory provision in an Act, or in force under an 
Act, specified in the Schedule to this Act), and the 
statutory authority which would normally grant it: 
(f) Be accompanied by a statement of the economic, social 
and environmental effects of the proposed work: 
(g) Be supplemented by such other reports, plans, statements, 
or information (including am1plification of any of the 
ma t t e r s r e f e r re d t o i n par a gr a ph s ( a ) t o ( f ) i n t h i s 
subsection) as the Minister notifies the applicant 
he considers necessary. 
Clearly the requirements listed above are mandatory and should 
there exist any omissions and/or irregularities of a serious 
nature, then the application could be rendered void. This point 
w as c ons i d er e d b y t h e C our t o f A p pe al i n CREE D N Z I n c • v . 
3 Governor-General. In that case the plaintiffs
4 
(the 
environmental group known as the Coalition for Rational 
Economic and Environmental Development in New Zealand Inc and 
Mr G.J. Holden) challenged the validity of an Order in Council 
3. [1981] l NZLR 172 
4. Although technically the applicants in the proceedings, 
CREEDNZ and G.J. Holden are referred to herein (as they were 
by the Court) as the plaintiffs to avoid confusion with the 
respondents in the proceedings (who were the applicants 
under the Act). 
l O. 
applying the Act to an aluminium smelter and associated works 
contemplated by the third and fourth respondents (South 
Pacific Aluminium Ltd and the Ota go Harbour Board) at Aramoana. 
Counsel for the plaintiffs submitted firstly that the application 
of the respondents failed to comply with section 3(2)(c) in that 
the scheme plan of subdivisions which accompanied the 
application did not comply with the provisions of the Local 
Government Act. 5 
Before considering this submission, Cooke J. observed that 
counsel for the plaintiffs did not argue that these omissions 
would in themselves nullify the whole application. Cooke J. 
appears to be insinuating that he might not have even considered 
the point raised on this ground. Nevertheless, since the issue 
did in fact arise he proceeded to deal with it as follows:
6 
It is not necessary to go into details of the omissions. 
Applying the approach taken by this Court in such cases 
as New Zealand Institute of Agricultural Science v. 
Ellesmere County [1976] l NZLR 630; Wybrow v. Chief 
Electoral Officer [1980] l NZLR 147, 160-161; and 
A.J. Burr Ltd v. Blenheim Borough Council [1980] 2 NZLR 1, 
I am satisfied that the irregularities are not so 
serious as to nullify the part of the application relating 
5. One of the consents sought was approval of the scheme plan 
for subdivisions. Under normal planning procedures the 
respondents would have been required to apply to the local 
county council under Part XX of the Local Government Act 
1974. 
6. Supra. n.3 at 175 
11 . 
to subdivision. Both the County Council, in carrying 
out investigations under s.6(1) of the National Development 
Act with a view to de c id i n g on a re c om me n d at i on to the 
Tribunal, and the Tribunal itself in its inquiry will be 
able to require any further particulars needed. 
Secondly, counsel for the plaintiffs contended that the 
statement required by section 3(2)(f) in the respondents' 
application was inadequate as to economic and environmental 
effects. Cooke J. was of the contrary opinion finding that 
these matters were dealt with sufficiently fully to satisfy 
section 3(2)(f). In arriving at this conclusion, he simply 
stated that portions of this part of the application claimed 
"in some detail advantages for the national economy, 
particularly in the major expansion of exports and employment 
opportunities" while environmental effects were dealt with 
"reasonably fully The question must be one of degree: 
it would be impossible to state all the economic, social and 
environmental effects. 117 
From the somewhat cursory fashion in which Cooke J. rejected 
the plaintiff's allegations of defects in the respondents' 
application, certain conclusions might be made. Firstly, 
that any omissions and/or irregularities in an application 
would have to be of a considerably serious nature to invalidate 
an application; secondly, that the Court does not see its role 
as being one of determining the merits of the contents of an 
application (which is really an Executive decision) but simply 
7 • S u pr a n . 3 a t l 7 6 
12. 
to ensure that the requirements of the Act are complied with; 
thirdly, that applications are unlikely in practice to be 
struck down on this ground unless substantially defective. 
3 • Th e pre l i mi nary de c i s i on u n de r s • 3 ( 3 ) 
(a) Section 3(3) generally 
In respect of an application made under section 3(1), 
subsection (3) provides that the Governor-General in Council 
may apply the provisions of the Act to a proposed Government or 
private work (or any part of it) after taking into account 
the following considerations: firstly, that the work is 
"a major w or k t h at i s l i k e l y t o be i n the n at i on al i n t ere s t " ; 
and secondly, that the work is "essential for the purposes of: 
(i) the orderly production, development or utilisation of New 
Zealand's resources; or (ii ) the de v e l o pm e n t of New Zeal a n d ' s 
self-sufficiency in energy ... ;
8 
or (iii) the major expansion 
of exports or of import substitution; or (iv) the development 
of significant opportunities for employment"; and finally, 
that it is ''essential a decision be made promptly as to whether 
or not the consents sought should be granted." 
Cl e a r l y t he de c i s i on to a p pl y t h e pr o v i s i ons of t he Ac t t o 
a work is in the nature of a preliminary decision which 
effectively sets the wheels of the Act in motion. In theory, 
the decision has no bearing on the eventual outcome of whether 
or not the consents sought in the application will be granted. 
However, it is generally acknowledged in practice that the 
decision to apply the Act to a proposed work is the activation 
of Government policy which will more than likely result 
ultimately in the granting by the Governor-General of the 
8. This excludes atomic energy as defined in s.2 of the 
Atomic Energy Act 1945 
13. 
consents sought pursuant to section 11. 
Before the Order in Council is made pursuant to section 
3(3), the Minister has an obligation to consult the united 
or regional council within whose district it is proposed 
that the work be situated and such other statutory authorities 
h .d . 9 a s e c ons i e r s a ppr o pr i at e • 
is not .butlined in the Act. 
The extent of this consultation 
It is submitted that all the 
Minister need do to com~y with this requirement would be 
to simply seek advice or information from the appropriate 
Although for practical purposes this might simply 
result in the council feeling that it is not being completely 
bypassed at this early stage of the proceedings, consultation 
may have the additional advantage of forestalling any potential 
local problems arising or backlash from that quarter at a 
later stage. 
Since the Act was passed, only three Orders in Council have 
been made pursuant to section 3(3). The first was the 
National nevelopment Order 1980 made in relation to the 
a p pl i cat i on by Petr al g as C h em i c al s NZ Ltd i n re s pe c t of t he 
methanol plant at \'/aitara and associated works. The second 
was the National Development Order 1981 which relates to New 
Zealand Synthetic Fuels Corporation Ltd 's application 
regarding the synthetic petroleum plant at Motonui and 
associated facilities. Thirdly, the National Development Order 
(No. 2) 1981 relating to the application by South Pacific 
Aluminium Ltd in respect of a proposed aluminium smelter at 
Aramoana and associated facilities. This third Order in Council 
9. National Development Act 1979, s.3(4) 
14. 
was the subject of four sets of proceedings, three of which 
were brought by the Environmental Defence Society Inc and 
one by CREEDNZ Inc. 
Before turning to the important issues raised in those cases, 
i t i s a ppr o p r i at e at t h i s s t age t o c ons i de r t h e nature of t h e 
authority which is given the power to make the decision 
under section 3(3), the nature of that power and what 
constitutes a major work. 
(b) The Governor-General in Council 
The Governor-General in Council is vested with the power to 
apply the Act to a proposed work under section 3(3). What 
role does the Governor-General have in the decision-making 
pr oc es s? It is clear from the definition of "Governor" 
and 'Governor-General" in section 4 of the Acts Interpretation 
Act 1924 that he acts by and with the advice and consent of 
the Executive Council. But without going into this question 
in any depth it is as well to remember that the office of 
Governor-General is constituted by paragraph l of the Letters 
Patent of 1917 of George V while paragraph V provides:
10 
In the execution of the powers and authorities vested 
in him, the Governor-General shall be guided by the 
advice of the Executive Council, but if in any case he 
shall see sufficient cause to dissent from the opinion 
of the said Council, he may act in the exercise of his 
said powers and authorities in opposition to the opinion 
of the Council, reporting the matter to Us without 
10. New Zealand Gazette, 1919, p.1213 
15° 
delay, with the reasons for his so acting. 
In theory, at any rate, it seems that if the Governor-General 
"sees sufficient cause" he may reject the advice of the 
h b f h E . C ·1 11 ot er mem ers o t e xecutive ounci • Whether this is likely 
to occur in practice is another matter; indeed, the Governor 
G e n e r a l ' s pr e s e n c e i s n o t e v e n n e c e s s a r y at t h e me et i n g of 
the Executive Council wh e r ea t its advice and consent is 
. . . f. d 12 s1gn1 ie • I f any one per s on is t o be i dent if i e d as be i ng 
responsible for the decision taken under section 3(3), it is 
the ~Hnister of National Development. After all, it is he 
who: 
11. 
12 • 
l 3. 
II after seeking the opinion of his colleagues 
and taking such departmental and other advise as he 
considers necessary, presents to Cabinet, and, formally, 
to the Executive Council, such measures as may require 
the Governor-General's consent. 1113 
Refer Dr F.M. Brookfield, "No Nodding Automation: A 
Study of the Governor-General's Powers and Functions" 
1978 NZLJ 491 
Acts Interpretation Act 1924, s.23(1) 
CREEDNZ v. GOVERNOR-GENERAL (1981] l NZLR 172 at 188 
16. 
(c) The nature of the power exercised by the Governor-
General in Council 
Although it is not expressly stated, the decision taken by 
the Governor-General in Council is by Order in Council, which 
is clear from the provisions of the Acts Interpretation Act 
1924 and section 17(3) of the National Development Act and 
w hi c h ex pe r i e n c e t o d at e h as s h own . 
The questions arise as to whether this function is legislative 
or administrative in nature, and whether this distinction has 
any practical effect. As to the first question, there can be 
little doubt that an Order in Council is legislative in forr.i, 
being delegated tothe Governor-General by the empowering 
statute. But it can also be viewed as an administrative 
action. Whatever label is used to characterise the Order in 
Council made pursuant to section 3(3) there can be little 
doubt that it may be impugned on the grounds such as breach 
of natural justice and that the Executive Council acted 
ultra vires. 
( d ) What is a "major work"? 
The first of the criteria which the Governor-General in 
Council must take into consideration is whether or not the 
proposed work is a "major work". No attempt has been made 
to define this phrase in the Act or in the decisions of 
t h e C our t of A p pe a l . 
l 7, 
Some attempts, however, have been made by the American Courts 
to define the phrase "major federal action" expressed in 
section 102(2)(c) of the U.S. National Environmental Policy 
Act. I n a pa pe r by D . A . R • W i 11 i a ms 
14 
t w o of Ues e A me r i c a n 
cases are referred to in this context. In the first, the Court 
held that "major federal action . .,·. , refers to the cost of 
the project, the amount of planning that preceded it, and the 
time required to complete it II 15 while in the second it 
stated that a major federal action "requires substantial 
planning, time, resources, or expenditure. 1116 
In the New Zealand context, the phrase "major work" is 
qualified by the words "likely to be in the natural interest" 
which makes definition even more difficult. Whether a 
work is of a substantial scale to be a "major work" is a 
question of fact in each individual case to be determined 
by a value judgement. 
l 4 . D . A . R . W i l li a ms " L e gal D e v e l o pm e n t s i n A ppr o v a l P r o c e s s e s -
The National Development Act 1979 of New Zealand" in 
Energy Law in Asia and the Pacific (1982) p.391 
15. Hanley v. Mitchell (1972) 460 F.2d 640, 644; 4 E.R.C. 1152, 
1155 (U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit) 
16. Natural Resources Defence Council v. Grant (1972) 341 
F.Supp.356; 3 E.R.C. 1883, 1890 (U.S. District Court, 
Eastern District, North Carolina). 
18 
(e) Judicial review of the section 3(3) decision 
When it was first introduced into Parliament, the National 
Development Bill excluded the judicial review of Orders 
in Council. However, when the Bill was reported back 
from the Lands and Agriculture Select Committee, this aspect 
was removed. With the obstacle overcome and the insertion 
into section 3(3) of the list of criteria to be considered 
by the Governor-General in Council, it was clear from the 
outset that judicial review would be available in respect 
of an Order in Council made pursuant to the subsection. 
Following enactment, but prior to any challenge of any Order 
in Council made, well founded doubts were expressed as to 
the potential for success of an a ppl ica ti on for judicial review 
of a decision to apply the Act under section 3(3). For 
ex ample: 
17 
..• given the nature and context of the statute it 
i s h a r d t o see h ow a n a p pl i cat i o n f or rev i e w ( or 
declaration) might succeed, in the absence of quite 
bizarre behaviour by the Governor-General or his 
Ministers. First, in relation to the decision to 
apply the Act, it must be noted that this is a 
mere preliminary decision which swings the Act's 
procedures into operation. In such cases, courts 
h a v e b e e n re l u c t a n t t o r e v i e w , a n d e s pe c i a 11 y 
reluctant to review on the basis that anyone other 
t h a n t h e a p pl i c a n t o u g h t r i g h t l y t o b e h ea r d . 
Secondly, and this is a consideration which applies 
to both section 3(3) and section 11 decisions, the 
subject matter of the Act seems more closely allied 
with the national emergency situation than with the 
17 Johll J--lannan "The National Development Act 1979" 9 NZULR 200 
· at l'.03 
19 
mundane business of peace-time administration; 
in the former area the courts again have tended to 
be reluctant to review. On the other hand, with 
such a lengthy list of criteria to be considered it 
ma y b e t h at t h e re i s s c o pe f or a r g um en t a b out w h e t he r 
the Governor-General has in a particular case 
exercised his power for a purpose within the statute, 
or whether he could reasonably have considered that 
exercise of the power in this case would be within 
t h e pu r po s e s of t he s ta t u t e ; t he R e a d e v . S mi t h [ l 9 5 9 ] 
N . Z • L . R . 9 9 6 a p pr o a c h • 
This approach may be especially relevant to attempts 
to challenge the final section 11 decision, but there 
are difficulties. As to the "natural interest" 
criteria, note that the work must only be considered 
to be "likely" to be in the national interest; a 
doubly subjective empowering clause. And what court 
would not shrink from considering the parameters of 
the "national interest" in such an overt fashion? 
More hope is offered by the criteria in section 3(3)(a) 
and (b). Yet while we at least have a list of criteria, 
or purposes, under paragraph (a) (lists always give 
t h e a p pe a r a n c e o f pr e c i s i o n ) , a 11 of t he matt e r s i n 
that paragraph raise very large issues of economic 
philosophy and analysis, which would be justiciable 
only with great difficulty, if they are justiciable 
at all. The problem of justiciablility arises, it is 
submitted, even if the test involved is one of 
20. 
whether a reasonable decider could have formed the 
view that a particular decision would be for the 
purposes of the Act. 
Given the status of the decision-maker here and given 
the problematic nature of the section 3(3) criteria, 
it would seem more likely that review would proceed 
on the basis of a failure to consider relevant matters 
and/or consideration of irrelevant matters, or possibly 
of a fettering of discretion (as by some declaration 
of an absolutely unshakeable commitment to a particular 
de v e 1 o pm e n t e v e n be f ore t he Ac t ha s been a p pl i e d ) . 
In an area of decision-making fraught with political 
pressures it may not be too difficult to raise such 
arguments, although obtaining the information necessary 
to substantiate them may be a different matter. 
The first judgement delivered by the Court of Appeal in 
r e s pe c t of t h e N a t i o n a 1 D e v e 1 o pm en t Act , E n v i r o nm e n t a 1 D e f e n c e 
Society Inc v. South Pacific Aluminium Ltd
18 
the plaintiffs 
(the Environmental Defence Society Inc and the Royal E"orest 
and Bird Protection Society of New Zealand Inc) challenged 
the Order in Council made pursuant to section 3(3) and sought 
discovery of documents from, and leave to administer 
interrogatories to, the respondents (South Pacific Aluminium 
Ltd, the Otago Harbour Board, the Minister of National 
De v e 1 o pm e n t and t he G o v e r n or -G e n e r a 1 ) . 
18. [1981] 1 N.Z.L.R. 146 
21 
As against the Minister and the Gove!'lnor-General, the 
proceedings were against the Crown; thus the first issue 
to be decided by the Court was whether or not it had 
jurisdiction to order discovery and interrogatories against 
the Crown. 
For the plaintiffs it was argued that, pursuant to section 17(6) 
of the National Development Act, section 10 of the Judicature 
Am e n d me n t A c t l 9 7 2 a p pl i e d t o t he p r o c e e di n g s b e f or e t h e 
Court, thus giving it power to require any party to make 
discovery of documents or to permit any party to administer 
interrogatories. Moreover, they pointed to section 27 of the 
Crown Proceedings Act 1950 which allows interrogatories and 
discovery against the Crown in any "civil proceedings". 
For the Crown, the Solicitor-General contended that the 
proceedings before the Court did not fall within the definition 
of "civil proceedings" in section 2(1) of the Crown 
Proceedings Act 1950 (which excludes "proceedings by way of 
an application for review under Part I of the Judicature 
Amendment Act 1972 to the extent that any relief sought in 
the application is in the nature of mandamus, prohibition or 
certiorari.") 
The Court held as a matter of fact that declarations were 
the primary relief sought by the plaintiffs. Since the 
Declaratory Judgments Act 1908 was made binding on the Crown 
by section 5(2) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1950, and 
recognising that discovery is a valuable adjunct to proceedings 
for a declaration, the Court considered that it had juri sdi cti on 
to order discovery and interrogatories against the Crown. 
2 2. 
Since the jurisdiction under section 10 of the Judicature 
Amendment Act 1972 is discretionary, it remained to be 
decided whether interrogatories and discovery would be 
allowed. In respect of the interrogatories sought to 
be administered, the Court held that these were fishing 
interrogatories and oppressive, and were disallowed in toto. 
Discovery, however, was seen as a different matter:
19 
If parties such as the present plaintiffs were 
denied all access to the respondents' documents it 
could in practice be virtually impossible to challenge 
an Order in Council under the National Development 
Act on any grounds going to the reasons for the 
Order. The Act itself recognises, however, that 
such Orders in Council should be subject to judicial 
rev i e w • Th ere are l i mi t s t o t h e s c o pe <f ju di c i al 
review .•. but we do not think that it would accord 
with the intention of Parliament, embodied in the 
Act, if the Court were to shackle itself by denying 
access to highly relevant evidence. These cases 
are of major public importance. Public confidence 
in the administration of the Act and in judicial 
safeguards would be shaken if the Court were to 
confine the scope of review so narrowly as to 
invite suggestions of rubber-stamping. 
Adopting a common-sense approach, the Court, in allowing 
discovery, limited it to documents of cardinal importance in 
vi e w of th e larg e number of documents. The documents of 
19. Ibid at 150 
23. 
cardinal importance, in the Court's view, were those 
considered by the Executive Council or Cabinet on or about 
the day on which they decided to advise the Governor-General 
to apply treAct, including any documents referred to 
therein and those necording any decision or advice determined 
by the Council or Cabinet. 
The case is important in showing how far the Court of Appeal 
is prepared to go in realising its responsibilities under 
the Act. Indeed, the Court was even disposed to the opinion 
that the Minister ought to have given oral evidence at the 
hearing and made himself available for cross-examination. 
The Crown did not agree and, although it did make an 
affidavit of documents in compliance with the Court order, 
objected to the production of the relevant documents. 
Annexed to the affidavit was a direction from the Deputy 
Prime Minister that the Clerk of the Executive Council object 
to the production of the relevant documents and not to produce 
them unless the Court decided otherwise. It was claimed that 
discovery was contrary to the public interest because the 
documents" ..• relate to consideration at the highest levels 
of the Executive of matters connected with policies of the 
Government; that such consideration should be able to be 
given on the basis of free and frank advice; and that the 
possibility of such documents having to be made public is 
likely to inhibit the giving of such advice. 1120 With 
specific reference to the Cabinet paper and advice sheet 
tendered to the GD.' e rnor-General (both of which were contained 
tn(. 
inAaffidavit's schedule) the direction reasoned that discovery 
20. 
l
,. , I ,....., ,... "·- ·, , 
-. I L •- · , 
,,.,...., - .... \ '#'. ••• ' - ...... ~=·~/ ·-=:.· ;. ':-" _:.. 
EDS Inc v. South Pacific Aluminium Ltd (No.2) [1981] 
l NZLR 153 at 155. 
24. 
was inappropriate since the documents were concerned with 
the implementation of current Government policies and could 
present an incomplete picture of the reasons for the advice 
given to the Governor-General; furthermore, it was argued 
that discovery would effectively contravene the obligation 
of secrecy between Councillors in respect of matters discussed 
in Council and thus prejudice the effectiveness of Government 
business. 
These arguments and the criteria set out in section 3(3) 
of the Act (which were not a 11 u de d t o by the De put y Prime 
M i n i t t e r ) we r e c o n s i d e r e d b y t h e C o ur t of A p pe a 1 i n 
Environmental Defence Society Inc. v. South Pacific Aluminium 
Ltd (No. 2) 21 following a motion by the plaintiffs (the 
Environmental Defence Society Inc and the Royal Forest and 
Bird Protection Society of New Zealand Inc) for production 
of the documents listed in the schedule to the Clerk's 
affidavit. The Court unanimously rejected the claim of 
C r ow n p r i v i 1 e g e • The Court was in no doubt as to its 
jurisdiction to inspect the documents itself or to order 
production for inspection by the plaintiffs in spite of the 
Minister's objection. Cooke J. relied solely on the House 
22 
of Lords decision in Burmah Oil Co. Ltd v. Bank of England 
and the decision of the High Court of Australia in Sankey 
v. Whitlam 23 while both Ric~ardson and McMullin JJ also 
reviewed other recent decisions,
24 
all of which reflect a 
21. Idem 
22. I 1980 I A.C. 1090; 11979 I 3 All E.R. 700 
23. (1978) 142 CLR l 
24. For example, Conway v. Rimmer [1968] A.C. 910; 
[ 1968] l All r.-R-.-13"74 anaETston v. State Services 
Com mi s s i on [ l 9 7 9 J l NZ L R l 9 
25, 
trend against according immunity from disclosure to 
Executive documents merely on the grounds that they relate 
to government policies at the highest levels. However, the 
Court recognised that the jurisdiction is discretionary and, 
with respect to Cabinet or Executive Council documents, 
should be sparingly exercised. 
In finding that there was good reason to order inspection, 
Cooke J. looked to the "unusually strict 1125 criteria or 
tests of section 3(3) of the Act noting the use of the strong 
word "essential" twice and the special procedure for judicial 
r e v i e w pr o v i d e d i n s e c t i o n l 7 • H e c o n s i d e r e d t h a t t h e l at t e r 
section was contemplated by Parliament as complementing the 
speci1al powers conferred on the Governor-General in Council 
and that the Court's role in safeguarding against stretching 
of the Act beyond its true scope necessarily included the 
power to order the ins pe c t i on of d o cum e n t s . 
The Court arrived at the conclusion that although the Order in 
Council appeared regular on its face, the terms of the 
Deputy Prime Minister's direction raised a substantial doubt 
as to whether Goernment policy, rather than the criteria 
provided in section 3(3), had predominated when the decision 
pursuant to that section was taken. What role did the Court 
consider policy might play with respect to a decision made 
26 
pursuant to section 3(3)? Cooke J. stated: 
25. EDS v. South Pacific Aluminium (No.2) supra at 157 
26. Idem 
26 • 
Policy must be involved to some extent in a decision 
under s.(3)(3). For instance, it is necessarily 
involved in considering whether a work is "likely to 
be i n t h e n at ion al i n t er e s t " . B u t t o a l a r g e ex t e n t 
the Act states the policy and empowers the Governor-
General in Council to decide whether the work or a 
decision is essential for the purposes of that policy. 
For instance, the Act recognises that the major 
expansion of exports and the development of 
s i g n i f i c a n t o p po r t u n i t i e s f or em pl o y me n t are de s i r a b le 
goals or policies. The decision whether a work is 
essential for those purposes must be essentially a 
decision of fact and discretion in the particular case, 
even if policy elements also enter into it. Again, 
t h e q u e s t i on w h et her a de c i s i on be made pr o m pt l y as 
to whether 0r not the consents sought should be 
granted calls for a value judgment. In some cases, 
no doubt, policy may have to be taken into account 
in arriving at that judgment, but the question poses 
a specific and strong test turning on much more than 
policy. 
Richardson and McMullin JJ agreed that section 3(3) allowed 
room for consideration of policy questions but that did not 
mean a decision could be made on that basis without consideration 
of the prescribed criteria. 
One is forced to the conclusion that, had the Deputy Prime 
Minister's direction alluded to the fact that the Cabinet paper 
did in fact disclose that the criteria outlined in section 3(3) 
2 7 • 
received due consideration, the Court may well have exercised 
its discretion differently. In any event, the Court ordered 
that the documents in question be produced for its inspection 
before reaching a conclusion as to whether their production 
should be ordered to the parties. After carrying out 
inspection, the Court refused disclosure of the contents of 
the documents to the plaintiffs. 
Thus, although the plaintiffs eventually succeeded in their 
actions against the Crown they were denied access to the 
documents they so keenly sought to support their challenge 
to the validity of the Order in Council applying the Act to 
the smelter project. It is a matter of conjecture whether or 
not the documents would have assisted the plaintiffs in their 
later substantive claim. As it happened, the CREEDNZ Inc case 
(which attacked the same Order in Council) came before the 
Court first and thus the plaintiffs in the earlier two cases 
re l i e d on s om e what di f fer e n t gr o u n d s i n t h e i r " t hi r d r o u n d " 
in the Court of Appeal. 
The issues which were dealt with in CREED1E Inc v. Governor-
General had an even greater impact on administrative law in New 
Zealand and it is clearly the leading case on section 3 of 
the National Development Act. 
As has already been discussed, the Court rejected the allegation 
of the plaintiffs that the Order in Council was invalid because 
o f d e f e c t s s a i d t o e x i s t i n t he a p pl i c a t i on i t s e l f . T he 
Court was also quick to dismiss the allegation of fraudulent 
misrepresentations said to have been made by the third 
2 8 • 
respondent (South Pacific Aluminium Ltd) to the Governor-
General in Council. 
The first significant contention of the plaintiffs was whether 
the property owners affected were entitled to see the 
application and a reasonable opportunity of making written 
submissions on it to the Executive Council before the Council 
decided to advise the Governor-General to make the Order in 
Council applying the Act to the proposed works. In other 
words, does anyone affected by a decision made pursuant to 
section 3(3) have the right to be heard before the decision 
is taken? The issue is one of statutory interpretation. 
The Act does not expressly require compliance with the 
principles of natural justice at this stage of the procedure, 
but neither does it expressly exclude compliance. Therefore, 
the Court had to consider whether or not the Act implied the 
right to a hearing before the section 3(3) decision. 
The Court of Appeal saw no need to restate the well-settled 
general principles in this area of administrative law, which 
had been done the previous year~ the same court in 
D 
. ~A. • f I . . 27 H . aganayasi v. 1·1inister o mmigration. owever, it was 
noted by Richardson J. that in applying those general principles 
it must be remembered that in deciding whether a natural 
justice obligation should be imported there are no hard and 
fast rules and will depend on all the circumstances of the 
28 
pa-rticular case. 
27. [1980] 2 NZLR 130 at 141 
28. CREEDNZ Inc v. Governor-General supra n.3 at 186-7 
2 9. 
Taking into account the uniqueness of the legislation before 
it, the Court decided that it would be inconsistent with the 
scheme of the Act to imply in it, or engraft on to it, the 
right to a hearing before the preliminary decision was taken 
in terms of section 3(3). Cooke J. stated:
29 
••. it has to be remembered that a streamlining 
of procedures is the very purpose of the National 
Development Act. It is only to be expected that 
some rights will be done away with in the process. 
In my opinion the points made by the plaintiffs about 
the loss of rights by property owners fall far short 
of showing that Parliament could have contemplated 
that the Executive Council or Cabinet would be 
obliged to afford some preliminary opportunity of 
a "hearing". S uc h an o b li g at i on c o ul d n ot be 
engrafted without doing violence to the scheme of 
the Act. 
It is clear that the Act is a code and as such provides other 
safeguards (such as the stringent compliance with section 3(3), 
the prior requirement of Ministerial consultation with the 
relevant united or regional council and the various provisions 
for public notice) and the right of full participation at the 
later Planning Tribunal hearing. 
Other reasons were given~ the Court for holding as it did 
on this issue and taking them all into account it is difficult 
to argue with their conclusion. 
29. Ibid at 177 
30. 
The second major issue considered was whether the decision 
to apply the provisions of the Act to the work was invalid by 
f b . d t . t· It t· · t d 3 o reason o ias or pre e ermina ion. was an 1c1pa e 
that this could provide a ground for impugning the preliminary 
decision of the Governor-General in Council made pursuant to 
section 3(3) owing to the mandatory consideration of the 
criteria listed in that subsection. 
In the CREEDNZ Inc case, the plaintiffs specifically alleged 
that the Executive Council was biased in favour of the 
applicants in arriving at its decision. In support of their 
claim, the plaintiffs referred to public statements made by 
certain Ministers which were alleged to show that the Executive 
Council had made up its mind in advance. Although the Court 
of Appeal did not take up the point, there does appear to be 
a distinction between bias and predetermination. In Franklin 
v. Minister of Town and Country Planning
31 
Lord Thankerton 
pointed out that bias occurs when a person in judicial or 
q u a s i - ju d i c i a l off i c e de pa r t s fr om t h e s ta n d a r d of e v e n - h a n d e d 
justice. Following that case the allegation of bias in 
CREED~Z might have been determined on the basis that the 
E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l a et e d n e i t h e r i n a ju d i c i a l n or q u a s i -
judicial capacity in making its decision to apply the Act to 
the work in question. 
However, the Court concentrated on the allegation of 
predetermination. Cooke J. was of the opinion that whether or 
not there was a real probability of suspicion of predetermination 
30. See, for example, J. Hannan, supra at 203 
31. 194-8 A.C.87, 103-4-
31 . 
or bias was irrelevant to a decision of this nature at 
this governmental level. 
32 
He stated : 
Realism compels recognition that before the 
end of July 1980 the Government had decided that a 
smelter project by the company in the South Island 
was likely tobe in the national interest and 
that from an early stage the Government had favoured 
us i n g t h e N at i on al Devel o pm en t Ac t f or i t It 
would be naive to suppose that Parliament can have 
meant Ministers to refrain from forming and expressing 
even strongly, views on the desirability of such 
pr o j e c t s u n t i l 
Council. 
the stage of advising on an Order in 
I n d e t e r m i n i n g w h at a m o u n t s t o i m pe r mi s s a b l e p r e d e t er mi n a t i o n , 
the Court considered that the only relevant question was whether 
at the Executive Council meeting the members genuinely addressed 
themselves to the criteria in section 3(3) and considered that 
those criteria were satisfied. Th us, if the Executive 
Council meeting was merely a "rubber stamping" of Government 
Commitment to the smelter project, then it could only be 
concluded that the ,nembers' minds were closed to any 
alternative other than to apply the Act to the work and that 
would render the Order in Council invalid. The Court was 
convinced, however, that the Ministers did in fact turn their 
minds to the merits of the application and that neither the 
terms of the Order in Council nor the newspaper reports of 
Ministerial statements disclosed that the Ministers' minds 
were closed at the time of advising the making of the Order 
in Council. 
3 2 • S u pr a n • 2 8 at l 7 9 
32· 
Two points may be taken from the Court's decision on the 
issue of predetermination. The first is the extent to which 
the minds of the Ministers must be closed before the Court 
will declare a decision of the Governor-General in Council 
pursuant to section 3(3) invalid. The CREEDNZ case strongly 
re f l e c t s t h e C our t ' s s t a n c e i n f a v o u r of t h e pr e s um pt i o n of 
regularity of Executive action. It seems that it would need 
to be shown that the Ministers were totally committed to the 
project to the extent that little if any consideration was 
given to the section 3(3) criteria .at the time of advising 
the Governor-General. As Richardson J. stated: 
I t w o u l d b e u n r e a l i s t i c t o ex pe c t M i n i s t er s t o 
have completely open minds as to the criteria set out 
i n s • 3 ( 3 ) of t h e N at i o n a l D e v e l o pm e n t Ac t or a s t o 
t h e d e s i r a b i l it y i n t h e pub li c i n t e r e s t of a pr o po s e d 
work. 33 
T h e s e c o n d po i n t i s t h e a p par e n t l y i m po s s i b l e b u r d e n fa c e d 
by a potential challenger of the decision of proving that the 
Minister's minds were so foreclosed that no genuine consideration 
was given to the section 3(3) criteria. Given the fact 
situation m CREEDNZ and the realistic approach taken by the 
Court of Appeal in that case, it is difficult to envisage how 
a party could possibly establish that the Minister's minds 
were not open to persuasion or that the Order in Council was 
ma d e a ft e r s i m pl y h a v i n g g o n e t h r o ugh t he m o t i o n s o f c o n s i d e r i n g 
the criteria of section 3(3). 
33. Ibid at 194 
33 
A further ground on which the section 3(3) decision might 
be impugned is by establishing that relevant considerations 
had not been tBken into account by the Executive Council. 
It was this issue which gave the Court of Appeal in CREEDNZ 
the greatest difficulty and the one which the ~aintiffs 
came close to succeeding with. The plaintiffs alleged 
t ha t t h e G over n or -G e n er a l fa i l e d t o ta k e i n t o a c c o u n t s e v e n 
matters which, had he done so, could not have justified the making of 
the Order in Council. Although the plaintiffs submitted strong 
arguments in their favour based on detailed affidavits of 
experts and the Crown chose not to have the Minister of 
National Development give oral evidence as suggested by the 
Court, the Executive Council's decision was again saved by 
the presumption of its having acted properly and the 
inability of the plaintiffs to discharge the requisite burden 
of proof. 
E a c h m em be r o f t h e C o u r t of A p pea l r e fer r e d t o t h e p r i n c i pl e 
stated by Lord Greene MR in Associated Provincial Picture 
Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corporation:
34 
The exercise of such a discretion must be a real 
exercise of the discretion. If, in the statute 
conferring the discretion, there is to be found 
expressly or by implication natters which the 
a u t h or i t y ex e r c i s i ng the di s c re t i on o ugh t t o ha v e 
regard to, then in exercising the discretion it 
must have regard to those matters. Conversely, if 
the nature of the subject-matter and the general 
interpretation of the Act make it clear that certain 
matters would not be germane to the matter in question, 
the authority must disregard those irrelevant collateral 
matters. 
34, 
The Court recognised its duty to inquire into whether or not 
the Executive Council directed itself properly in law and 
took into account the criteria set out in section 3(3). 
However, the burden was on the plaintiffs to prove on 
the balance of probabilities that their allegations showed 
that section 3(3) could not have been complied with. The 
Court noted that it is more difficult to discharge the burden 
of proving that something has not been taken into account 
which ought to have been, than proving that something has 
been taken into account which ought not to have been. 
Furthermore, Richardson J. added a further restriction on 
reviewability when he pointed out that the larger the 
policy content then the less inclined will the Court be to 
weigh the considerations involved. 
The considerations alleged to have been so all-important by 
the plaintiffs were not the only considerations, nor did the 
pl a i n t i ff s s h ow t h a t t he Mi n i s t er s we r e n o t al iv e t o the m. 
The Court did not consider itself qualified to define the 
precise content of the national interest or the other criteria 
set out in section 3(3)(a). This is understandable given that 
these considerations must often necessitate a political 
v a l u e ju d gm e n t by C a bi net on t h e fact s pr e s e n t e d t o them by 
their departmental and other advisors. 
Even though the criteria listed in section 3(3)(a) must meet 
the exacting test of essentiality, it is still difficult to 
see how a decision of the Executive Council could be impugned. 
35. 
The Court did appreciate that the word "essential" is a 
strong one and connotes a high degree of necessity, but 
it is for the Executive Council to make the value judgment 
on the basis of circumstances as they exist at the time as 
to whether the particular work would make an essential 
contribution to the goals identified in section 3(3)(a). 
The first criterion which the Executive Council must consider 
before applying the provisions of the Act to a work is whether 
a prompt decision is "essential". The Court of Appeal 
considered whether section 3(3)(b) had been properly applied 
in EDS Inc v. South Pacific Aluminium (No.3). 35 The 
plaintiffs provided evidence that the consents sought in the 
application would have taken a similar length of time by 
normal procedures as for National Development Act proceedings. 
This was contradicted by evidence from the first respondent 
company. However, the Court did not consider this argument by 
t h e pl a i n t i f f s h a d an y me r i t , s tat i n g t h a t t he i s s u e w as 
irrelevant. In the opinion of Cooke J.: 36 
[ T he G o v er n or -G e n er a l i n C o u n c i l ] i s n o t r e q u i r e d t o 
consider whether the National Development Act will 
enable a prompter decision than normal procedures. 
The Act has been passed in the expectation or hope 
that it will; whether the Act is likely to work as 
intended to achieve that purpose is not a question 
to which the Governor-General in Council is bound 
to have regard. 
35. [1981] l NZLR 216 
36. Ibid at 219 
36 
With respect, the learned Judge's interpretation appears 
unnecessarily restrictive. Certainly, a literal approach 
to paragraph (b) can lead to the Court's conclusion but, 
w he n t h e i n t e n t i on of Pa r li am e n t i n pa s s i n g t he Ac t i s 
considered, surely it was anticipated that the consents s::iught 
would be more promptly granted by utilising the Act instead 
of the normal procedures. Since the Act sacrifices certain 
existing rights under the normal planning procedures in its 
objective to have proposed works decided upon promptly, one 
mi g h t a t l e a s t h a v e e x pe c t e d t h e C o u r t t o we i g h u p t h e 
evidence presented and come to a conclusion as to whether the 
object of the Act was likely to be attained in this case. 
Furthermore, although the Court did note that the word 
"essential" in section 3(3)(b) was a strong one, the impression 
one is left with is that only lip-service was paid to it. 
The Court declared:
37 
Whether it is essential that prompt decisions be made 
in relation to major, long-term projects of this kind 
must be in fact a question of degree and value 
judgment •••• [I]t was a reasonably tenable view that 
the advantages in exports and increased employment 
claimed in the application were so important for New 
Zealand that it was ESsential to try to obtain them at 
the earliest possible date. There is nothing in the 
[ Cabinet J paper or any other evidence to suggest that 
the strength of "essential'' was lost on the Ministers. 
37. Ibid at 220 
37 
In using the words "at the earliest possible date" Cooke J. 
seems to contradict what he had stated earlier about the 
irrelevance of whether or not the Act might enable a prompter 
decision than otherwise might have been the case. However, it 
cannot be doubted that in deciding the issue relating to 
section 3(3)(b) the Court showed itself to be consistent 
i n i t s a ppr o a c h t o t h e sec t i on 3 ( 3 ) c r i t er i a • 0 n e i s i n e v i tab l y 
led to the conclusion that so long as at the time of advising 
the making of the Order in Council the Minsters address 
themselves to the criteria and do not omit anything obviously 
material, then the decision to apply the Act is virtually 
unshakeable. 
C . 
l . 
The Role of the Planning Tribunal 
Introduction 
The Planning Tribunal is established as a Court of record 
under section 128 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 
and for the purposes of conducting an inquiry under the 
National Development Act the Tribunal has all the powers, 
privileges and immunities conferred on it by Part VIII of 
38 
the former statute. To assist it in its objective of 
enabling the prompt consideration of proposed works of national 
importance and the granting of the requisite consents, the 
National Development Act provides for a "one-stop" planning 
hearing to be conducted by the Tribunal. 
38. t~ational Development Act 1979, s.7(2) 
38. 
Once the decision to apply the Act to a proposed work has 
been made, the Minister of National Development is required 
to refer the application forthwith to the Tribunal for an 
. . d d . 39 l n q u i r y , re port an re c o m men at l on • Before doing so, 
however, the Minister may delete any consent sought in the 
application if he considers that it should be applied for in 
the normal way; on the othe::- hand, the Minister has the power 
to add any consent not specified in the application.
40 
2. The Planning Tribunal inquiry 
The time at which the Tribu ral is directed to conduct its 
inquiry is "as soon as practicable" after receiving the 
certificate of completion of the audit from the Commissioner 
for the Environment. The Act specifies that every inquiry 
shall be held in public and that the holding of the inquiry, 
and the making of a report and recommendation, shall have 
priority over every other matter before the Tribunal (except 
any other application before it under the Act) .
41 The time 
saved by this provision would be minimal, if not illusory, 
in that the Tribunal is hardly likely to set the matter down 
for hearing immediately or vacate other matters which have 
already been allocated a hearing date. However, in giving 
National Development Act hearings priority the Tribunal's 
report and recommendation might be submitted more quickly. 
Either one or two assessors, by virtue of their skills or 
qualifications or of their knowledge of the area in which it 
is proposed to construct the work, may be appointed to assist 
39. Ibid, s.4(1) 
40. Ibid, s.4(2) 
41. Ibid, s.7(6) and (7) 
39. 
the Tribunal in conducting the inquiry and making the report 
d d t . 42 an re c om men a 1- on. In the hearings which have been 
conducted this has not been deemed necessary. Instead, the 
Special Division of theTribunal which sat at the hearings 
c o m pr i s e d t w o 1.J d g e s and four 1 a y me m b er s . 
The Tribunal is given the power to waive any omission from 
or delay or inaccuracy in any information, report, recommendation 
or step required or direct them to be remedied if it is 
s at i sf i e d t hat no part y t o t h e i n q u i r y w i 11 be pre ju di c e d 
43 
thereby; furthermore, the Tribunal is vested with the power 
to award reasonable costs if it thinks fit.
44 
T h e A c t c 1 e a r 1 y s et s out t h o s e pe r s o n s a n d b o d i e s en t i t 1 e d t o 
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be heard and those required to be represented. This will 
be more fully considered infra. 
What of the matters to be taken into account by the Tribunal 
in conducting its inquiry? Section 9(1) provides that they 
are the same as those that would have been taken into account 
if the applicant had followed the normal procedure of applying 
for planning consents. However, subsection 2 provides that 
the Tribunal shall not have regard to the criteria set out 
in section 3(3) of the Act except to such extent as is necessary 
42. Ibid, s.7(9) 
43. Ibid, s.7(7A) 
44. Ibid, s.7(13) 
45. Ibid, s.8 
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in order to comply with section 9( l). Thus, the Tribunal 
is precluded from having regard to whether the work is a 
r,a j or one t hat i s l i k e l y tn be i n t h e n at i on a l i n t ere s t or 
wh et h er the w or k i s e s s e n t i a l for the pu r poses s t ate d i n 
section 3( 3) ( a) or whether a prompt decision is essential; 
but this part of section 9(2) is expressly made subject to 
the extent to which it is necessary for the Tribunal to take 
into account those matters that would have been taken into 
account had the applicant applied for the consents in the 
normal way. 
An important issue which arises is whether, if consents are 
sought under the Town and Country Planning Act 1977, the 
Tribunal is in fact free to have regard to the question of 
the national interest in relation to the work by virtue of 
section 3( l) of that Act? 
Section 3(1) of the 1977 Act sets out the matters of national 
importance to be provided for in the preparation, implementation 
and administration of regional, district and maritime schemes. 
These matters include "the wise use and management of ;'-Jew 
Zealand 's resources" and much the same phrase appears in 
section 4 of that Act as part of the general purpose of 
planning schemes. The second part of section 9(2) of the 
National Development Act seems to imply that Ue Tribunal may 
have regard to whether the work is for the wise use and 
management of New Zealand's resources. 
The question ;vas considered in Re application by Petralgas 
Chemicals NZ Ltd 46 where the Tribunal was called upon to 
46. (1981) 8 NZTPA 106 
41. 
inquire into the wisdom of using natural gas for the 
manufacture of methanol for export. The Tribunal ruled that 
the question was not a relevant consideration, one reason 
being that section 9(2) provides that the Tribunal shall not 
be concerned to inquire into the criteria of section 3(3). 
It is unfortunate that the Tribunal did notsee fit to attempt 
a fuller consideration of sectim 9(2) and its relationship 
with section 9( l). It is clear from the case that the Tribunal 
did see its role as including the consideration of the 
provisions in section 3(1) of the Town and Country Planning 
Act but not to the extent of contradicting the policy decision 
of the Governor-General in Council pursuant to section 3(3) 
of the National Development Act. In considering the 
suitability of the site for the proposed work, however, the 
Tribunal did recognise that it had a duty to pay heed to 
the matters of national importance set forth in section 3(1) 
of the Town and Country Planning Act. Although the Tribunal 
appreciated that the site chosen appeared prima facie to 
contravene certain of the criteria in section 3(1) it did not 
view itself as a planning authority, and, in the absence of 
an y s pe c i f i c o pp o s it i on fr o m e x pert wit n e s s e s t o t he c h o ice of 
site the Tribunal found that it was suitable for the proposed 
use subject to the work meeting certain environmental standards. 
The more cogent reason given by tre Tribunal for finding that 
an inquiry into the wisdom of using natural gas for the 
manufacture of methanol was irrelevant was that the Town and 
Country Planning Act creates control over the use and development 
42. 
of land only; the Tribunal determined that the powers 
conferred on it by the latter Act cannot be used to direct how 
resources shall be used once they are no longer part of real 
property. In defining the scope of planning powers the Tribunal 
po i n t e d o u t t he t h re e b r o ad a s pe c t s t o a d e c i s i o n t o 
manufacture a particular product: the first is the decision 
to commit a particular raw material to a specific purpose 
(which is not subject to planning control); the second and 
third aspects relate to choice of site and environmental 
co n s e q u e n c e s re s pe c t i v e 1 y ( w hi c h a re s u b j e c t t o pl an n i n g c on t r o 1 ) . 
Similarly, in Re an application by N.Z. Synthetic Fuels 
Corporation Ltd
47 the Tribunal confirmed that although it 
was not precluded fromappl yi ng section 3 (1) of the Town and 
Country Planning Act it was not to have regard to the 
criteria set out in section 3(3) of the National Development 
Act by virtue of section 9(2). In his opening remarks, the 
Chairnan of the Tribunal, Judge Treadwell, stated:
48 
47. 
The Town and Country Planning Act 1977 enables the 
Tribunal to embark upon an inquiry into matters 
covered by that Act. That inquiry does not include 
an adjudication upon whether the production of 
synthetic petrol is a proper use of Hew Zealand's 
natural gas resources. The expression contained 
in s.3 concerning the wise use of resources is 
confined to matters which can be considered under 
that Act • Broad 1 y s pe a k i n g we mus t c onside r the 
apprcPriate placing of enterprises which wish to make 
( 19 81 ) 8 NZTPA 138 
48. Ibid at 142 
43. 
use of a resource which is of importance but we 
are not concerned with how that resource shall be 
used We will not enter into the controversy 
surrounding the desirability of the manufacture of 
s y n t h e t i c pe t r o l 
I would also record that the Minister by exercising 
his powers under the National Development Act has 
placed this manufacture of synthetic petrol in the 
field of national importance and as far as this 
Tribunal is concerned that is an end of that matter. 
It must be remembered that when the applications by Petralgas 
Chemicals NZ Ltd and NZ Synthetic Fuels Corporation Ltd came 
before the Tribunal section 9(2) of the National Development 
Act simply read as follows: "The Tribunal shall not be 
concerned to inquire into the criteria set out in section 3(3) 
of the Act." The words" ... except to such extent as is 
necessary in order to comply with subsection (1) of this 
section" were added by section 6 of the 1981 amendment Act. 
Although the effect of those additional words have not received 
judicial consideration, it is submitted that they merely 
attempt to give statutory effect to the approach taken by the 
Tribunal in the NZ Synthetic Fuels Corporation Ltd hearing 
. d 49 where it was state : 
What is to be done if one of the criteria set out in 
s.3(3) of the Act refers to a matter which would have 
been taken into account if the applicant had applied 
in the normal way? The section must be read so that 
it is a consistent whole, and that can be attained by 
49. Ibid at 151-2 
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giving full effect to the word "criteria". A 
criterion is defined as a "principle or standard 
that a thing is judged by," and that is how the four 
cl a s s e s of o b j e c t i v e; me n t i o n e d i n par a ( a ) of s . 3 ( 3 ) 
are used - that i~ for the Governor-General in Council 
to ju d g e w he the r or not the pr o v is ions of the 
National Development Act should be applied to a 
particular work. Therefore we interpret s.9(2) 
to ~ean that it is not the Tribunal's function to 
inquire whether or not the criteria are met or 
fulfilled, in the sense that they are prerequisites 
to the issue of the Order in Council under s.3. In 
other words, the Tribunal need not go beyond the 
Order in Council as a foundation for its jurisdiction 
to conduct its inquiry. (That interpretation is 
consistent with the language of s .7(1) of the Act). 
However, to the extent that any of the criteria set 
out in s.3(3) refers to a matter which would have been 
t a k e n i n t o a cc o u n t i f t he a p pl i c a n t h ad a p pl i e d i n t h e 
normal way, the Tribunal should take it into account -
no t as a c rite r i on for the a p pl i cat i on of the pr o v i s i ons 
ofthe National Development Act, but as a c:onsideration 
in determining whether planning consent should be 
recommended. 
It is submitted that the Tribunal had no alternative but to 
resolve the apparent conflict between the two subsections of 
section 9 in the way it did, thus pre-empting the amendment 
to section 9( 2). 
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In conducting its inquiry the Tribunal is hardly more 
restricted than when it conducts a hearing in respect of a 
matter which comes before it under normal planning procedures. 
This is apparent from the way the Tribunal viewed its role 
in the N.Z. Synthetic Fuels Corporation Ltd inquiry. In 
that case consent was sought for a specified departure from 
the district scheme pursuant to section 74(2) of the Town 
and Country Planning Act and, although the limitations 
defined in section 74(2) were not met, the Tribunal considered 
it had authority under section 69(2) to allow a specified 
departure if it found that it was warranted in the public 
interest in the particular circumstances of the case. The 
special reasons given by the Tribunal for invoking section 
69(2) were firstly, that the nature of the work was 
extraordinary (being one to which the .~ational Development 
Act had been applied and for which general provision could 
not be expected to have been made in the district scheme) and 
secondly, that the Executive Council's declaration that it 
was essential that a decision be made promptly precluded the 
~ore leisurely procedure of changing the district scheme. 
The Tribunal's stance was upheld in the Court of Appeal in 
North Taranaki Environment Proection Association Inc. v. 
50 Governor-General where the Court stated that "It would be 
strange if a result of words used in [ section 9(1) of the 
N at i on a l Dev e lo p me n t J Act w as t o g i v e t h e P la n n i n g T r i b u n al 
less power than that same Tribunal would have if considering 
51 
the question of consent under ordinary procedures." 
50. [1982] l NZLR 312 
51. Ibid at 314 
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Therefore the Court rejected the submission that the 
Tribunal, when acting under the National Development Act, 
was limited in its jurisdiction to those matters that would 
normally have been taken into account by the Council at 
first instance. Had matters been proceeded with in the 
normal way, an appeal to the Tribunal would have been 
inevitable and the same result achieved. 
In North Taranaki Environment Protection Association Inc. v. 
52 Governor-General the Court considered the plaintiff's 
submission that the Tribunal had no power to recommend 
consent to a water right 53 in a modified form. Because 
section 21(3) of the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 
gives a Regional Water Board jurisdiction to grant the right 
to discharge waste into any natural water "on such terms 
as it ma y s pe c i f y" t h e C our t h ad n o he s it at i on i n r u li n g 
that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to recommend as it did. 
It is interesting to note that after the Tribunal had conducted 
its inquiry, but before submitting its report and recommendation 
the National Development Anendme nt Act 198 1 was passed which 
provided in section 7(2A) that "Every such report shall 
recommend whether each consent set out in the application 
referred to the Tribunal should be granted, granted in a 
modified form, or not granted." Legislative recognition was 
thus give n to the Tribunal ' s recommend at ion , al t h o ugh the 
Court of Appeal evidently saw no need to so much as mention it. 
52. Ibid at 316 
5 3 . T o di s c h a r g e t r e ate d e ff l u e n t fr o m a n out fa 11 pi pe l in e 
into the Tasman Sea 
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Although the National Development Act confines the Tribunal's 
role to conducting an inquiry and reporting and recommending 
to the Minister 54 (instead of its usual role of actually 
making the first decision as to the granting of consents) 
neither the Tribunal itself nor the Court view the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal as being fettered in any way by 
the Act except to the extent outlined in section 9(2). 
D. The Ultimate Decision under Section 11 
The final decision in terms of section 11 is vested in the 
Governor-General in Council who, after taking into account 
the report and recommendation of the Tribunal and further 
considering the criteria set out in section 3(3), may 
declare the work to be one of national importance, grant 
such of the consents set out in the Tribunal's report as 
he thinks fit, and shall -
(a) Grant each consent for such term or period of time 
as he thinks fit; and 
(b) Impose such conditions, restrictions and prohibitions 
a s h e t h i n k s fit i n re s pe c t of e a c h s u c h c o n s e n t -
as if the consent had been granted in 
55 
the normal way. 
Since section 11 does not expressly provide for refusing the 
declaration and consent one might be forgiven for gaining the 
impression that the decision is, in effect, a "rubber-stamping" 
of the earlier section 3(3) decision. However, the Court of 
54. National Development Act 1979, s.10(1) 
55. Ibid, s.11 
48. 
Appeal has recognised that " ... it is clear as a matter of 
statutory interpretation that the Governor-General in 
56 
Council is not bound to grant what is sought." Furthermore, 
section 11(1) clearly requires the Governor-General in 
Council to "take into account" the Tribunal's report and 
recommendation and "further consider" the section 3(3) criteria. 
That much at least is mandatory. However, the fact remains 
that the Governor-General in Council can ignore the criteria, 
purposes and policy of the statutes requiring consents, which 
are matt~rs the Tribunal must take into account pursuant 
to section 9(1). No doubt the Governor-General in Council 
will be influenced by the Tribunal's report and recommendation 
but nothing compels him to be persuaded by their findings. 
Even if the Governor-General disagrees with findings of 
fact by the Jribunal, it is submitted that this will not 
provide a ground for impugning the section 11 decision as long 
as it cannot be shown that either the Tribunal's report 
and recommendation were not "taken into account" (which is 
a far cry from meaning they were relied on) or that the 
section 3(3) criteria were not again considered. 
Section 13 of the Act provides that when the Order in 
Council made under section 11 comes into force, every consent 
granted by it is deemed to have the same force and effect as 
if it had been granted in the normal way and the statute under 
which each consent would normally have been granted is to 
apply in respect of that consent as if it had been granted 
under that statute so far as is practical and with the necessary 
modifications. 
56. CREEDNZ Inc v. Governor-General, supra at 175 
49. 
E. Parliamentary Consideration of Orders in Council 
After the Order in Council under section 11 is made, it 
must be laid before Parliament within fourteen days if 
Parliament is in session and, if not, within fourteen days 
after the date of commencement of the next ensuing session.
57 
Although Parlia~entary debate on the Order in Council is 
thereby assured the procedure is irreversible and nothing 
will be altered unless the OJvernment so desires. However, 
if the provisions of the Order in Council differ from the 
Tri b u n al ' s re c o mm e n d at i on t he M i n i s t e r of N at i on al De v e l o p me n t 
must provide Parliament with written reasons for the 
difference.
58 
F . F u r t h e r A p pl i c at i o n s u n de r t h e A c t 
Section 14 provides that once the section 11 decision has 
been affirmatively made the applicant may apply for a further 
consent to the Minister who in turn refers the matter to 
the Tribunal and the matter then proceeds as if application 
had been made under section 3. 
Similarly, where a consent has been granted under section 11 
the applicant and the statutory authority which would 
normally have granted the consent may apply to the Minister 
for the variation or cancellation of any condition, 
restriction or prohibition imposed in respect of the consent 
or for the imposition of a new condition, restriction or 
prohibition. 59 Such an application is referred to the Tribunal 
57. Supra n.54, s.12(1) 
58. Ibid, s.12(2) 
59. Ibid, s.15(1) 
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which may consider that a full inquiry is justified in which 
case the standard procedures of the Act will swing into 
operation. If the Tribunal considers that a full inquiry 
is not warranted then the matter will be dealt with by 
written submissions. 
G. Participation by Other Bodies and the Public 
l . Participation by statutory bodies 
Virtually from the outset of the National Development Act 
procedure certain statutory bodies are involved. Before 
the decision to apply the Act to a work, the Minister is 
compelled to consult the united or regional council concerned 
and such other statutory authorities as he considers 
. 60 
appropriate. Once the decision is made the Minister 
must forthwith forward a copy of the application together 
with all documents and plans which accompanied it to the 
united or regional council, the territorial authority, the 
appropriate Regional \Yater Board, the National Water and 
Soil Conservation Authority, the Commissioner for the 
Environment, every statutory authority which would normally 
grant t he consents set out i n the a p pl i c at i on and f i n a 11 y , 
the Minister of Works and Development if the proposed work is 
a private 
61 
one. Furthermore, section 6 requires every 
statutory authority which would normally grant any consent 
set out in the application to carry out such investigations 
as it thinks appropriate and forward to the Tribunal its 
re c om file n d at i o n i n r e s pe c t of t re c o n s e n t , al t h o u g h an y s u c h 
recommendation is not to be regarded as evidence. These 
60. Ibid s.15(1) 
61. Ibid s .4(3) 
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statutory authorities are specifically advised of the 
l d d t f h T • b l I • • 
62 d t b p ace an a e o t e ri una s inquiry an mus e 
represented and adduce evidence at it.
63 The Minister of 
Works and Development (where the subject matter of the 
inquiry is a private work), the appropriate local authority, 
the Commissioner for the Environment and any body affected 
by the proposed work are all entitled to be heard at the 
T . b l ' . . 64 ri una s inquiry. 
It is clear that the Act provides for a relatively high 
degree of involvement by appropriate statutory bodies. 
Of particular importance is the role of the Commissioner for 
the Environment which calls for more detailed consideration. 
2. The Commissioner for the Environment 
The main role of the Commissioner for He Environment in 
the National Development Act procedure is set out in section 5. 
It provides that as soon as practicable after making an 
application under section 3, the applicant must forward to 
the Commissioner an environmental impact report on the 
proposed work. The Commissioner then makes the document 
available for public inspection, gives notice of this and calls 
for submissions in respect of it. After considering any 
submissions received he is required to audit the report by 
examining and giving his opinion on the accuracy and 
adequacy of it in so far as it relates to the proposed work 
and must forward a certificate that it has been completed to 
the Tribunal. 
62. Ibid s.7(3) 
63. Ibid s .8(3) 
64. Ibid s.8(1) 
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Although the Act thus gave statutory recognition to the 
Commissioner for the Environment for the first time, it is 
evident that the legislation raised more doubts that it 
h a d i n t e n d e d t o r e s o l v e . F or ex am pl e , n ow h e re i n t h e Ac t 
is "environmental impact report" defined nor is the exact 
nature, purpose and effect of the report and the Commissioner's 
audit detailed. These and other issues require consideration. 
Although no reference is made in the Act to the Environmental 
Protection and Enhancement Procedures issued by the 
Commission for tre E nvironment in 1974 (and revised in 1981), 
Woodhouse P. in delivering the judgment of tre Court of 
Appeal in Environmental Defence Society Inc v. South Pacific 
Aluminium Ltd (No. 4) 65 was guided by the Procedures which 
defines an environmental impact report as "a written 
statement describing the ways of meeting a certain objective 
or objectives and the environmental consequences of so doing.
1166 
In that case the Court was called upon to decide the 
a d e q u a c y o f t he a p pl i c a n t ' s e n v i r on m e n t a l i m pact r e po r t w h i c h 
the plaintiff claimed was so defective as to be a mullity 
for the purposes of section 5. In determining whether the 
report need only concern itself with the direct environmental 
consequences referrable to the immediate site of the proposed 
work or whether it ought to include secondary and indirect 
consequences, the Court stated there must be a real and 
sufficient link between the less direct effects likely to flow 
65. [ 1981] l NZLR 530 
66. Commission for the Environment Environmental Protection 
and Enhancement Procedures (1981 Revision) para 8, p.4 
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from the projected works if they are to be regarded as 
relevant. In deciding whether or not an environmental 
impact report is adequate the Court was of the opinion that 
it was a question of fact and degree in the particular case. 
I n t re c a s e b e f ore i t t h e C our t h e l d t ha t t he a p pl i c a n t s we r e 
not required to include the secondary implications of the 
proposed work in their report, although it was noted that 
the case was a marginal one. In any event the report 
11 s u f f i c i e n t l y s i g n post e d t h o s e s e c on d a r y i m pl i cat i ons a n d 
it cannot be said that it is so deficient in that regard as 
not to constitute an environmental impact report for the 
pu r poses of the leg i slat i on . 11 
6 7 
In the course of i~ judgment the Court clarified a number of 
matters left unsaid in the National Development Act. 
Recognition was given to, and assistance gained from, the 
Com~ission's Procedur es The Court also emphasised the 
important role played by the environmental impact report 
which it saw as including 11 .•. adequate and reliable reference 
to every matter that is significant and relevant and so 
provide a coherent and sufficient basis for consideration by 
the public and by those local authorities and individuals 
who may be affected and by the Commissioner himself as a 
starting point for the important audit he must make •
116 8 
Furthermore the Court did mt see Parliament's intention as 
limiting every environmental impact report to site-specific 
environmental considerations. 
67. supra n.65 at 536 
68. Ibid at 534 
- ~·· .... ' . 
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But what about the Commissioner's audit? The Act does 
not provide for the possibility of tte- Commissioner referring 
an inadequate environmental impact report to the applicant 
a n d h i s r o 1 e ha s b e e n s e e n a s s i m pl y " . . . c on f i n e d t o 
dispensing information to the public, and the time limits 
he must operate within may render even this activity of 
limited 
69 
value." H owe v er , i n En v i r o nm en ta 1 De f e n c e 
Society Inc v. South Pacific Aluminium Ltd (No. 4) the Court 
of Appeal saw the matter differently/O 
It is said that the report provided by an applicant 
is merely a starting-point and that any remedy in the 
event of an inadequate report must be at the next 
stage, when the Commissioner for the Environment 
is to embark upon his audit. It would of course be 
extraordinary if he were to feel inhibited in the 
discharge of his own responsibility by the absence 
of reference in a report to some relevant matter. 
That consideration is reinforced by the requirement 
of s.5(3) that the Commissioner consider the 
environmental implications of the work - rather 
than confine himself to an assessment of the 
environmental impact re port. 
However, the Government reacted by amending section 5(3) in 
section 2 of the 1981 Amendment Act which r e quires the Commiss-
ioner to "audit the environmental impact report by examining 
and giving his opinion on the adequacy and accuracy of the 
report in so far as it relates to the proposed work." 
69. J. Hannan "The National Development Act 1979" 
9 NZULR 200 at 208 
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SS. 
In spite of this, the Commissioner considers that his power 
to audit is 
71 
largely unaffected by the amendment and that 
his discretion to consider matters outside the environmental 
impact report remains very broad. A f t er al l , h e ma y 
take into account any submissions received within the 
permitted time period and these submissions would be of little 
significance if they related only to the report and not the 
environmental implications of the work itself. Furthermore, 
since the subsection calls upon the Commissioner to give his 
opinion on the "adeqc1acy" of the report he must inevitably 
consider the totality of environmental impacts. 
3. Participation by interested bodies and the public 
The National Development Act confers considerable rights in 
so far as public notification and access to informationis 
concerned. For example, at the time the Minister refers the 
application to the Tribunal he must give public notice of 
the fact and any person may obtain a copy of the application 
on payment of such reasonable fee as may be fixed, although 
certain affected persons are required to be either served 
w it h n o t i c e , or w i t h a c o p y , of t h e a p pl i c a t i o n . 
7 2 
Al s o , 
public notice is given of the availability for inspection of 
the environmental impact report on its receipt by the 
Commissioner for the Environment, a copy of the report may 
be obtained for a fee and submissions may be made in respect 
of it.
73 
71. Refer S. Kendadine "The Commission for tl-e Environment -
Some Insights" (1982) NZLJ 290. 
72. National Development Act s.4(3),(4),(S) and (6) 
73. Ibid s.S(2) 
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Public notice is given of the place and date of the Planning 
T • b l I • • 74 ff ri uAa s inquiry and any body or person a ected by 
the proposed work or representing some relevant aspect of 
t h e p u b l i c i n t e re s t ha s t he r i g h t t o be pr e s e n t a n d b e 
heard at the Tribunal's inquiry. 75 Those intending to be 
present or represented at the inquiry must notify the 
Tribunal and the applicant in writing of that intention and 
will thereafter receive a copy of the further particulars 
required to be filed by the applicant.
76 
The Tribunal's 
re po r t a n d re c om me n d at i on a r e m ad e a v a i l a b le f or pub l i c a t i on 
and copies thereof are forwarded to those who attended the 
. . 7 7 
i nq ui r y • A copy of every plan referred to in the section 
11 0 r d er i n C o u n c iJ mu s t al s o b e m ad e a v a i l a b le f er pu b l i c 
. . 7 8 
inspection. 
It is submitted that although adequate provision for public 
participation is made in the Act, the practical benefit 
therefrom may be seen as somewhat illusory. Persons or bodies 
who may wish to challenge decisions taken are given precious 
little time in which to prepare for the decision as to whether 
to take proceedings. Furthermore, those who have made written 
submissions to the Commissioner for the Environment are not 
given written notice of the Tribunal's inquiry date. It is 
unfortunate that in its desire for speed in having the consents 
granted the Government clearly overlooked some fundamental 
practical matters. 
7 4. Ibid s.7(3) 
7 5. Ibid s .8(1) 
7 6 • Ibid ss.8(4) and 7 ( 5) 
7 7 . Ibid s.10(2) 
7 8. Ibid s.11(2) 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Al t h o ugh the N at i on a l D eve l o pm en t Act l 9 7 9 h as bee n t he 
subject of a great deal of controversy and criticism (not 
all of which has been unjustified) few will deny the need 
for a streamlining of planning procedures, particularly in 
re s pe c t of ma j or w or k s o f n a t i o n a l i m po r t a n c e • M a n y f e a r s 
have been allayed by the limited use to which the Act has 
been put. The major advantages envisaged in the Act - the 
provision of a single procedure for having the various 
consents granted for a project, the greater certainty in 
r e s pe c t of t h e t i me i n w hi c h a p r o j e c t c o u l d p r o c e e d a n d 
the retention of the final decision in the Government as to 
whether or not a project would proceed - were achieved while 
acknowledging the important role to be played by the Court 
of Appeal. For their part, the Planning Tribunal and 
Court of Appeal have acted responsibly and competently in 
the m at t er s w h i c h h ave c om e be f ore t he m , g i v i n g e f f e c t t o 
the legislative intent and at the same tir.ie recognising and 
clarifying inbuilt statutory safeguards. 
As to whether consents sought might be more rapidly granted 
under the National Development procedure then under normal 
planning procedures is a moot point. Certainly the former 
procedure is much more efficient and it could not be 
outstripped by the latter procedures. Practice has shown 
that perhaps the greatest time-saving has been achieved by 
the direct referral of challenges and appeals to the Court 
of Appeal, thus leap-frogging the first stage (the High Court) 
in the normal appeal process. 
58. 
It is appreciated that the recently elected Labour Government 
is committed in policy to repealing the Act. In spite of 
this the new Government acknowledges the advantages of a 
single hearing procedure in planning matters and future 
restructuring will oo doubt be greatly assisted by 
e x pe r i e n c e g a i n e d f r o m t h e N at i o n al De v e l o pm e n t A c t • 
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V. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
\Yhere reform is to be restricted to encompass only a 
limited number of major works of national importance (as 
was envisaged with the National Development Act) then it 
is anticipated that the Labour Government would look 
favourably on simply enacting special statutes to deal 
separately with each project, as was done in relation to the 
Manapouri scheme. This was the alternative proposed by 
the Labour Opposition at the time the National Development 
Bill was being aired in Parliament in 1979. It is submitted 
-th~ loc.al element 
that this approach bypasses to a large extentA(which is 
so much a feature of our planning processes) and is hardly 
a s u b s t i t u t e f or s o u n d pl a n n i n g l e g i s l at i o n . 
At thetime of writing the whole area is in limbo. The 
National Development Act remains for the time being and it is 
a matter of conjecture as to precisely what, if anything, 
w i 11 take its place foll ow i n g its re peal . The Labour Party 
Official Policy Release 1984 states that a comprehensive review 
and consolidation of all planning and environmental 
legislation will be initiated. It is proposed to make it 
easier for applications under the Town and County Planning Act, 
the Water and Soil Conservation Act and th e Clean Air Act 
to be considered at one hearing before the Planning Tribunal 
and dispensing with the initial local authority hearing if all 
o f t h e par t i e s a gr e e . IV h et her t hi s w i 11 b e a c c o m pl i s h e d by 
specific amendments to those statutes or by separate 
empowering legislation remains to be seen. The former approach 
is more likely in view of the fact that the policy release 
60. 
envisages the review of all planning and environmental 
legislation, the amendment of the Town and Country Planning 
Act to allow the Minister of National Development to advise 
the Planning Tribunal that a particular issue is of 
national importance and tQbe given priority, and the 
revision and consolidation of the Water and Soil Conservation 
and Rivers Control Acts. 
At present no Government Department has been specifically 
charged with the task of carrying out the groundwork 
in anticipation of amending existing,or drafting alternative, 
legislation to give effect to existing policy (it is of 
course, possible that existing policy may change). However, 
there has been in existence for well over a year a draft 
proposal to reform existing planning procedures, prepared by 
a working party of the Energy Advisory Committee. Numerous 
comments have been received by the Committee from various 
sources and many of these comments have been incorporated in 
a separate document with the proposal for reference to the 
Secretary of Energy in the near future. It is anticipated 
that the document will be circulated amongst the pertinent 
Ministers of the Crown. The Committee's proposal may or 
may not be acted upon and no doubt there will be others. 
In essence the Committee's suggestion involves the classification 
by the applicant of his proposal as having either national, 
regional or local significance which application, if of 
61 . 
national significance, is filed with the Minister of Works 
a n d D e v e l o pm e n t • The application is then advertised 
and interested persons may notify their interest and be 
entitled to further details. At this stage an informal 
public meeting is held if requested by the applicant or if 
required by the relevant authority. Following a report 
b y t h e re l e v a n t a u t h or i t y , t h e a p pl i c a n t w o u l d be r e q u i r e d ( i f 
appropriate) to forward an environmental impact report to 
the Commission for the Environment for audit. This is seen 
a s a pr og r e s s i v e s t e p f r o m t h e N at i on al D eve l o pm e n t Ac t 
procedure wherein the report comes at a relatively late 
stage • 
Persons who had notified an interest could then object or 
accept the proposal. If objections are received, an informal 
conciliation conference is held. Whether this should form a 
part of planning procedures is a debateable issue. Although 
the joint purposes of attempting to achieve compromise and 
defining the issues in dispute are obvious, should not planning 
procedures be beyond compromise? 
A n O r d e r ( gr a n t i n g of c o n s e n t s a p pl i e d f or ? ) c o u l d t h e n b e 
made if all parties were in agreement and the authority 
considered that it was in the public interest. Otherwise a 
hearing would be held; in the case of an application of 
national interest this would be by the Planning Tribunal. 
The draft proposal is unclear as to whether the Tribunal 
makes the decision to grant the consent(s) or simply makes a 
recommendation to the !vlinister of Works and Development. An 
appeal on points of la'w might be made to the High Court 
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sitting with not less than three judges. The draft 
p r o po s a 1 i s s i 1 e n t a s t o w h e t h e r a f u r t he r a p pea 1 t o t he 
Court of Appeal is possible. If so, valuable experience 
gained from the National Development Act has gone unheeded. 
A 1 thou g h t he C om m is s i on ' s pr o po s a 1 g i v e s gr e ate r 
satisfaction to interested parties, the question remains 
as to whether its effect is much different from that of the 
National Development Act procedure if the final decision lies 
with the Minister. 
T. B 1 ac k 
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